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ons. Aside from seeking a pardon, the offender can only move to a more
progressive state in order to regain the franchise.
The most obvious exception to the general rule excluding felons stems
from society's own inadequate methods of crime control: those who are not
caught and convicted for their crimes are, of course, never deprived of the
right to vote. Following the reasoning of the "purity of the ballot" theory,
one might ask whether states with a higher than average percentage of unsolved crimes have a less "pure" ballot.
The recent past has not been kind to Texas voting laws. One by one, the
barriers to suffrage have been falling. 49 As yet, the United States Supreme Court has not dealt with the question of the disfranchisement of felons
in a definitive manner. There is a discernible pattern of opinions suggesting,
however, that laws like the one in Texas are eventually doomed as a result
of judicial expansion of the equal protection clause.
This year, Texas has an opportunity to reconsider its statutory and constitutional voting exclusions. During this year's session, the legislature will
consider a new state constitution. One may assume that the Constitutional
Revision Commission intends to write a document that will reflect the realities of a society that is mature enough to live up to its promise of rehabilitation to the offender. By eliminating the provisions that disfranchise felons,
Texas can show that it is a leader, not a follower, in the area of rehabilitation
and treatment of felons. By choosing not to eliminate the provisions, it is
evident that Texas would only be postponing an inevitable, progressive
change. More important, the state would continue to sanction the special
status of felons, that being something less than full citizenship.
William R. Schipul

TELECOMMUNICATIONS--OMNIBUS

CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE
STREETS ACT OF 1968-THE AUTHORIZATION PROCEDURE:
FACT OR

FICTION?

18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970).

In the wake of a rising crime rate and a growing fear of the awesome
power and influence of organized crime,' the President appointed a Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice. 2 The Commission reported:
49. See 50 NoRT CAOLINA L. REv. 903 (1972).
1. See 1968 U.S. CODE CONo. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2116 (S. REP. No. 1097, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess.).
2. PRESIDENT'S

CoMMISSION

ON

LAW

ENFORCEMENT AND

JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY
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A majority of the members of the Commission believe that legislation
should be enacted granting carefully circumscribed authority for electronic surveillance to law enforcement officers. .... 8
The Commission had discovered that organized crime utilizes wire and oral
communications and concluded that interception was vital to law enforcement.4 Nearly every law enforcement association in the nation recommended to the Congress that specific procedures to obtain judicial approval

of interceptions be adopted.5

The Safe Streets Act of 1968,6 the first comprehensive federal telecommunication legislation, superseded Section 695 of the Federal Commission
Act of 19347 which prohibited interception and divulgence of wire communication.8 Specifically designed to comply with constitutional standards set
forth in the early Supreme Court cases9 the new Act became the subject of
3. Id., quoted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2286 (S. REP. No.
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.) (emphasis added). All members of the Commission believe that if authority to employ these techniques is granted it must be granted only
with stringent limitations . . . . Id. at 2286.
4. See 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2112, 2284-86 (S. REP. No. 1097,
90th Cong., 2d Sess.).
5. ld. at 2163:
(1) The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice.
(2) The Judicial Conference of the United States.
(3) National Association of Attorneys General.
(4) National District Attorneys Association.
(5) Association of Federal Investigators.
(6) All living former U.S. attorneys for the southern district of New York.
(7) The National Council on Crime and Delinquency.
6. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the Act or Safe
Streets Act]. Signed into law on June 19, 1968. The Act, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82
Stat. 197, is divided into five titles: Title 1, Law Enforcement Assistance; Title II,
Admissibility of Confessions, Reviewability of Admission in Evidence of Confessions
in State Cases, Admissibility in Evidence of Eyewitness Testimony and Procedures in
Obtaining Writs of Habeas Corpus; Title III, Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance;
Title IV, State Firearms Control Assistance; Title V, General Provisions. Title III is a
combination of the Federal Wire Interception Act introduced by Senator McClellan
(Dem. Ark.) on Jan. 25, 1967 and the Electronic Surveillance Control Act of 1967
introduced by Senator Hruska (Rep. Neb.) on June 29, 1967. The Act prohibits surveillance except in cases where needed for the investigation of certain crimes and
then only within prescribed limits.
7. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of June 19, 1934,.48
Stat. 1103).
8. Prior to its amendment by title HI, section 605 provided:
[N]o person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of such intercepted communication to any person; and no person not
being entitled thereto shall receive or assist in receiving any interstate or foreign
communication by wire or radio and use the same . . . for his own benefit or for
the benefit of another not entitled thereto . ...
Id. § 605.
9. See 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2113 (S. REP. No. 1097, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess.). Congress considered the constitutional standards set out in Berger
v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S. Ct. 1873, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1040 (1967); Katz v. United
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controversy and judicial interpretation. 10 Critics especially feared that title
fI1 was an undesirable invasion of the right to privacy. 1'
An unlikely source of litigation, the authorization requirement has become
a grave source of irritation to the Justice Department.'

2

The appropriate

section reads as follows:
The Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General specially
designated by the Attorney General, may authorize an application to a
Federal judge of competent jurisdiction for, and such judge may grant
in conformity with section 2518 of this chapter an order authorizing or
approving the interception of wire or oral communications .... 13
Seeking to prevent abuse, the Act minimizes discretion and creates responsibility in the authorizing officials by setting up a two step process: 14
First, the wiretap application must be authorized by the Attorney General or
Assistant Attorney General specially granted authority to act by the At-

torney General. Second, the identity of the person authorizing the application must be made known to the authorizing judge and through his order, to
any party to a'proceeding in which intercepted communications are offered
in evidence.

Though other requirements are the essential safeguards of the Act,'

the

States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967). For a discussion of the
requirements set forth in these cases see Note, Eavesdropping Provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Sale Streets Act of 1968: How Do They Stand in Light of
Recent Supreme Court Decisions?, 3 VALPARAIso U.L. REV. 89 (1968).
10. See Schwartz, The Legitimization of Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of
"Law and Order", 67 MICH. L. REv. 455 (1969).
11. The constitutionality of title III has been affirmed by most courts but questioned in numerous law review articles. E.g., United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679
(10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 934 (1972); United States v. Focarile, 340
F. Supp. 1033 (D. Md. 1972); United States v. LaGorga, 336 F. Supp. 190 (W.D. Pa.
1971); United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523 (S.D. Cal. 1971); United States v.
Lawson, 334 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1971); United States v. Becker, 334 F. Supp. 546
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); United States v. Perillo, 333 F. Supp. 914 (D. Del. 1971); United
States v. Leta, 332 F. Supp. 1357 (M.D. Pa. 1971); United States v. Scott, 331 F.
Supp. 233 (D.D.C. 1971); United States v. Sklaroff, 323 F. Supp. 296 (S.D. Fla. 1971);
United States v. Escander, 319 F. Supp.,295 (S.D. Fla. 1970), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom., United States v. Robinson, 468 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1972), remanded, No.
71-1058, 5th Cir., Jan. 16, 1973. Some law review articles have thought title III to be
unconstitutional. E.g., Fife, Eavesdropping Under Court Order and the Constitution:
Berger v. New York, 1 LOYOLA U.L. REV. 143 (1968) (Los Angeles); Schwartz, The
Legitimization of Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of "Law and Order", 67 MICH.
L. Rav. 455 (1969); Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance by Leave of the Magistrate:
The Case in Opposition, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 169 (1969).
12. At the time of United States v. Robinson, 468 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1972),
remanded, No. 71-1058, 5th Cir., Jan. 16, 1973, the principal case in this area, the
Justice Department informed that court that there were 13 unreported decisions of
the United States District Courts pending appeal in six circuits. There were also 92
cases pending in 29 different United States District Courts.
13. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1970) (the authorization requirement).
14. See 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2112, 2189 (S. REP. No. 1097, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess.).
15. There are several independent procedural requirements in title I in addi-
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authorization procedure clearly was meant to be more than a technical formality.' 6 This is illustrated in United States v. Robinson,"7 the leading and
most often cited case for the proposition that a strict compliance with the
statute is necessary. The affidavits filed in the case clearly show that there
was deviation from the statutory scheme set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1).18
The Executive Assistant who was authorized to act in this situation by the
Attorney General merely approved actions by designating Assistant Attorney General Will Wilson to authorize the judicial application.

Then, Wil-

son's deputy approved the authorization as he did in all cases where Wilson
was designated.

Thus, neither the Attorney General nor the Assistant At-

torney General acted personally in authorizing the application to the district judge.
The government argued that the power of the Attorney General to authorize a wiretap application is in fact delegable under another statutory provision, 28 U.S.C. § 510.19 However, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir20
cuit summarily rejected this contention.
Since § 510 already existed when § 2516(1) was enacted, the inclusion
in the latter statute of language specifying who the Attorney General
tion to the authorization requirement; i.e., the wiretapping may not be authorized
for an unduly long period of time, probable cause must be shown, all other avenues of
gaining the evidence must be exhausted, the identity of the individual observed and the
purpose must be disclosed. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (1970).
16. This provision centralizes in a publicly responsible official subject to the
political process the formulation of law enforcement policy on the use of electronic surveillance techniques. Centralization will avoid the possibility that
divergent practices will develop. Should abuses occur, the lines of responsibility
lead to an identifiable person. This provision in itself should go a long way
toward guaranteeing that no abuses will happen.
1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2185 (S. REP'. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d

Sess.).

17. 468 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1972), remanded, No. 71-1058, 5th Cir., Jan. 16, 1973.
Remand was made for an evidentiary hearing to determine if the wiretap applications
were properly authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1970). The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit disfavored resolving the authorization issue simply on the basis
of two affidavits.
18. Sol Lindenbaum duly sworn said:
I reviewed the submitted material, concluded that the request satisfied the
requirements of the statute, and also concluded, from my knowledge of the Attorney General's actions on previous cases, that he would approve the requests if
submitted to him. Because the Attorney General was unavailable on any of the
three occasions, I approved each of the requests pursuant to the authorization
which he had given to me to act in the circumstances and caused his initials to be
placed on memoranda to Will Wilson. The memoranda approved requests that
authorization be given to Robert W. Rust to make the applications for interception orders.
No. 71-1058, at 14-15 (5th Cir. Jan. 16, 1973) (Appendix).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 510 (1970) states: "The Attorney General may from time to
time make such provisions as he considers appropriate authorizing the performance by
any other officer, employee, or agency of the Department of Justice of any function of
the Attorney General."
20. Accord, United States v. Narducci, 341 F. Supp. 1107, 1114 (E.D. Pa. 1972);
United States v. Aquino, 338 F. Supp. 1080, 1083 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
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could specially designate to perform the instigating function would have
been surplusage if Congress meant that the Attorney General could authorize the performance of this duty by any officer, employee or agency
of his department. We therefore conclude that § 2516(1) was intended
to operate as a limit upon § 510, rather than that § 510 broadened the
circumscribed authority set out in § 2516(1).21
The numerous cases decided around the time of Robinson indicate that
the procedure followed therein was by no means unusual.2 2 On the contrary, it appears to have been the standard operating procedure. In United
States v. Focarile,23 there was a request for approval of a wiretap when the
Attorney General was away from Washington, D.C. Mr. Lindenbaum, the
Executive Assistant to the Attorney General, reviewed the application and
supporting documents. From his alleged knowledge of previous actions by
the Attorney General on similar cases, Mr. Lindenbaum approved the request in the belief that the Attorney General would have approved it.24
The court reached the conclusion that neither the Assistant Attorney General nor the Attorney General authorized the application and accordingly
suppressed the wiretap evidence.
Having failed in the argument that 28 U.S.C. § 510 provides the Attorney
General with general delegation authority, the government resurrected the
so-called "alter ego" theory. This theory claims that given the nature of the
office and the practical necessity of having a personal aide with fiduciary responsibility, the aide and the officer should be treated as one.
Applying the theory to the authorization requirement, the government
contention has been that when the Attorney General is unavailable, the Executive Assistant is the Attorney General's "alter ego."' 25 Delegation to
21. United States v. Robinson, 468 F.2d 189, 191 (5th Cir. 1972), remanded,
No. 71-1058, 5th Cir., Jan. 16, 1973.
22. E.g., United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972); United States
v. Fox, 349 F. Supp. 1258 (S.D. Ill. 1972); United States v. Vasquez, 348 F. Supp. 532
(C.D. Cal. 1972); United States v. Boone, 348 F. Supp. 168 (E.D. Va. 1972); United
States v. Narducci, 341 F. Supp. 1107 (E.D. Pa. 1972); United States v. Focarile,
340 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Md. 1972); United States v. Aquino, 338 F. Supp. 1080 (E.D.
Mich. 1972); United States v. Baldassari, 338 F. Supp. 904 (M.D. Pa. 1972); United
States v. Chial, 336 F. Supp. 261 (W.D. Pa. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-1201,
3d Cir., April 13, 1972.
23. 340 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Md. 1972).
24. Id. at 1051. Mr. Lindenbaum claimed a general authorization was given to
him by the then Attorney General Mitchell to act in such a situation. After Mr.
Lindenbaum placed the Attorney General's initials on the memorandum to Will Wilson, the Assistant Attorney General's staff reviewed, and an assistant to Mr. Wilson
signed his signature authorizing a United States Attorney to make the application to
the court. The court reached the conclusion that Will Wilson failed to authorize the
application and therefore suppressed the wiretap evidence.
25. E.g., United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522, 528 (4th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Narducci, 341 F. Supp. 1107, 1114 (E.D. Pa. 1972); United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1058 (D. Md. 1972); United States v. Aquino, 338 F.
Supp. 1080, 1083 (E.D. Mich. 1972); United States v. Chial, 336 F. Supp. 261, 267
(W.D. Pa. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-1201, 3d Cir., April 13, 1972.
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him is deemed to satisfy the statute. However, the "alter ego" theory was
26
rejected by those courts dealing with the issue.
In United States v. Giordano,27 the government argued that there was a
good faith effort to comply with the statute, that the authorizing official was
eventually identified and that delegation is dictated by necessity. 28 However, the court rejected these arguments for two reasons: Such delegation
violates the intent of Congress to rest responsibility with a public official

subject to the political process; acknowledgement of responsibility for the
authorization is not an adequate substitute for prior personal approval. In
short, the government argues the spirit not the letter of the law is important.
In conrast, the courts have held the letter of the law to be important.
. . . Congress has made form as important as substance; Congress was
concerned not just with the integrity of the internal Justice Department
review of agency wiretap requests, but also with the identity and status
29
of the person initiating the authorization ....
In the typical situation, responsibility may still be traced.

But the govern-

ment's reasoning has the inherent danger of qualifying anyone within or
without the Department of Justice as an "alter ago." Some future Attorney
General could, after the fact, repudiate any connection with a politically embarrassing wiretap authorization.30 That eventually justifies strict adherence to the language of the statute.
The government advances an argument first raised in United States v.
Narducci31 that if Congress had desired the authority in question to be nondelegable, it would have expressly stated so.3 2 This argument is not persua3
sive since 18 U.S.C. § 2518 does provide for suppression.A
Perhaps as a
26. E.g., United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522, 528 (4th Cir. 1972); United

States v. Narducci, 341 F. Supp. 1107, 1114 (E.D. Pa. 1972); United States v. Focarile,
340 F. Supp. 1033, 1058 (D. Md. 1972); United States v. Aquino, 338 F. Supp.
1080, 1083 (E.D. Mich. 1972); United States v. Chial, 336 F. Supp. 261, 267 (W.D.
Pa. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-1201, 3d Cir., April 13, 1972.
27. 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3513 (U.S. Mar. 27,
1973) (No. 72-1057).
28. Id. at 527-31.
29. United States v. Narducci, 341 F. Supp. 1107, 1114 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
30. Id. at 1114. "[Tihe Government, by determining who qualified as the Attorney General's 'alter ego', could, in effect, dilute the standard which Congress tried
to create."
31. 341 F.Supp. 1107 (E.D.Pa. 1972).
32. Id. at 1115. Congress during the same session in which 18 U.S.C. § 2516
was enacted amended § 245(a)(1) and provided that certification of criminal prosecution of civil rights violators may not be delegated.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1970);
Any aggrieved person . . . may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds
that(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted;
(ii) the order of authorization or approval . . . is insufficient on its face; or
(iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of authorization or approval.
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last resort, it is argued that there is no reason to apply the drastic remedy of
suppression to correct a "mere technical defect in procedure. ' 3 4 However,
this "mere technical defect in procedure," (failing to identify the person authorizing the application) is one-half of the two prong statutory mandate.3 5
This is not a mere technicality, but non-compliance with the basic requirements of the statute. This is expressly made grounds for suppression in
36
the statute and acknowledged as such by the courts.
Given a similar fact situation as found in Robinson, only one district court
has reached a contrary result. In United States v. Pisacano,37 it was held
that "[p]rocedures used clearly conformed with the letter of § 2516(1),
particularly when this is read in light of the evidence, furnished by § 101(a)
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 245(a)(1), that when Congress
wished to prohibit delegation of any sort, it knew how to do it . . .,.s
In Pisacano, there is a willingness to accept less than strict compliance with
the letter of the statute because the responsible official was eventually
identified.3 9 The courts have unanimously adopted the reasoning in Robin40
son and rejected that of Pisacano.
In a dramatic turn-about, the literal interpretation of the statute repre34. E.g., United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522, 531 (4th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Narducci, 341 F. Supp. 1107, 1115 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (1970): "Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire or oral communication shall specify(d) the identity of the agency authorized to intercept the communications, and of
the person authorizing the application ...."
36. See, e.g., United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Narducci, 341 F. Supp. 1107 (E.D. Pa, 1972).
37. 459 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1972), petition for cert. filed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3528 (U.S.
April 8, 1972) (No. 71-1410).
38. Id. at 263. Three recommended authorizations were at issue here. The latter
two were allegedly approved by the Attorney General himself; in the first case by
his initialed memorandum and in the second by specific telephone authorization to
Mr. Lindenbaum. Contra, United States v. Vasquez, 348 F. Supp. 532 (C.D. Cal.
1972). The court suppressed evidence based on a telephone authorization. Thus it is
difficult to estimate if that deviation from the authorization procedure will be sanctioned.
39. "[Als is evident from this case, that procedure does nonetheless ensure that
the responsible official be reasonably identifiable."
United States v. Pisacano,
459 F.2d 259, 264 & n.5 (2d Cir. 1972). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reasoned that discrepancy on the face of the application to the judge did not
violate 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(a), (4)(d), because the intent of Congress was to ensure
that responsibility be fixed and it was in the instant case.
40. E.g., United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972); United States
v. Fox, 349 F. Supp. 1258 (S.D. Ill. 1972); United States v. Vasquez, 348 F. Supp.
532 (C.D. Cal. 1972); United States v. Boone, 348 F, Supp. 168 (E.D. Va. 1972);
United States v. Narducci, 341 F. Supp. 1107 (E.D. Pa. 1972); United States v.
Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Md. 1972); United States v. Aquino, 338 F. Supp.
1080 (E.D. Mich. 1972); United States v. Baldassari, 338 F. Supp. 904 (M.D. Pa.
1972); United States v. Chial, 336 F. Supp. 261 (W.D. Pa. 1972), appeal docketed, No.
72-1201, 3d Cir., April 13, 1972.
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sented by Robinson has been circumvented by a factual distinction. The
Attorney General claims that he personally authorized all wiretap applications after November 20, 1971.41
Representative of this class of cases is United States v. Cox. 42 Allegedly,
Attorney General Mitchell personally reviewed this application as evidenced
by his initialed memorandum to Mr. Wilson reciting: "Pursuant to the powers conferred on me by Section 2516 of Title 18, United States Code, you
are hereby specially designated to authorize Calvin K. Hamilton to make
'4
the above-described application." 3
So unlike Robinson where the authorization was approved by officials not
authorized by the Act, 44 in Cox the authorization allegedly was personally
approved by Attorney General Mitchell. This renders immaterial the failure of the Assistant Attorney General to personally review, since here the
memorandum supplies the needed authorization. The memorandum, however, fails to fulfill all the requirements of the Act. Section 2518(1)(a)
and (4)(d) specify that each application include the identity of the officer
45
authorizing the application.

In contrast to Robinson, most courts in the Cox class of cases have overlooked deviation from the statute or interpreted the Attorney General's
memorandum as an authorization.4"
41. Proclaimed by sworn affidavit in United States v. Narducci, 341 F. Supp.

1107, 1112 (E.D.Pa. 1972).
42. 462 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1972). The affidavits in this case demonstrate that
the application for a wiretap was first considered by an attorney in the Organized
Crime and Racketeering Section of the Criminal Division of the Justice Department,
then forwarded to the Deputy Assistant to the Attorney General who forwarded to
the office of the Attorney General with a detailed recommendation that the authorization be granted. The Assistant Attorney General failed to personally authorize the
application.
43. United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1299 & n.7 (8th Cir. 1972).
44. I.e., the Attorney General's personal assistant and his Deputy Assistant. The
Act authorizes only those officials subject to the political process (appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate). In addition to the Attorney General this
includes nine Assistant Attorneys General. 28 U.S.C. § 506 (1970).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(a), (4)(d) (1970). In both Robinson and Cox there
is deviation from the requirements of the Act. But Attorney General Mitchell's memorandum claiming he personally authorized the wiretap application in Cox significantly shifts the controversy. In the Cox situation the only obstacle to admitting the
wiretap evidence is the failure of the application submitted to the judge to correctly
identify the authorizing official (it names the Assistant Attorney General not the Attorney General). In Robinson the identified official was not authorized. The former
is a violation of section 2518(1)(a), (4)(d); the latter a violation of section 2516(1).
In the Cox situation the factual question is: Who really made the authorization? In
Robinson the question is: How was the authorization made?
46. E.g., United States v. Fiorella, 468 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v.
Ceraso, 467 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Becker, 461 F.2d 230 (2d
Cir. 1972); United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 934 (1972); United States v. DeCesaro, 349 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. Wis. 1972);
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That requirement (that wiretap authorization not reach into lower echelons) should not be construed so inflexibly as to invalidate a wiretap application personally authorized by the Attorney General of the United
States simply because 4the
7 request recites the Assistant Attorney General
as the applying officer.
The fact that the application and order recites Mr. Wilson rather than Mr.

Mitchell authorized the application is deemed "irrelevant" in Cox, 48 and in

United States v. Whitaker,49 a federal district court reasoned there is no prejudice involved in the discrepancy.50 Likewise, there is no requirement that
the government establish the extent of consideration given by the authorizing
officials. 5 '
In contrast to Cox, two district courts 52 have disallowed the personally initialed Mitchell memoranda. In United States v. Casale5" the court held:

"The plain meaning of the words of the memo is that Will Wilson was specially designated in this case to exercise the power and discretion conferred
by the statute . . . to authorize the application for an order of court. The
memo .
is not an authorization to anyone to apply to this Court for an

order."
United States v. Kohne, 347 F. Supp. 1178 (W.D. Pa. 1972); United States v. Cantor,
345 F. Supp. 1352 (E.D. Pa. 1972); United States v. Mainello, 345 F. Supp. 863
(E.D.N.Y. 1972); United States v. Whitaker, 343 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Pa. 1972);
United States v. Consiglio, 342 F. Supp. 556 (D. Conn. 1972); United States v. Doolittle, 341 F. Supp. 163 (M.D. Ga. 1972); United States v. D'Amato, 340 F. Supp.
1020 (E.D. Pa. 1972); United States v. Iannelli, 339 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Pa. 1972);
United States v. LaGorga, 336 F. Supp. 190 (W.D. Pa. 1971); United States v. Sklaroff,
323 F. Supp. 296 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
47. United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1300 (8th Cir. 1972).
48. Id. at 1300.
49. 343 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Pa. 1972). However, in Cafero v. United States,
12 CRIM. L. REP. 2453 (3d Cir. January 30, 1973), the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit expressly disavowed the holding in Whitaker that title II of the Act was
unconstitutional.
50. Id. at 361; accord, United States v. Pisacano, 459 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir.
1972), petition for cert. filed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3528 (U.S. April 8, 1972) (No. 71-1410).
United States v. Consiglio, 342 F. Supp. 556, 560 (D. Conn. 1972). In Consiglio,
the defendants asserted the doctrine of estoppel contending that the former "misrepresentation" should preclude the present claim that Attorney General Mitchell authorized the application. The court rejected the argument because no prejudice to the
defendants could be shown to stem from reliance on the government's initial claim.
51. United States v. Consiglio, 342 F. Supp. 556, 560 (D. Conn. 1972); United
States v. Doolittle, 341 F. Supp. 163, 169 (M.D. Ga. 1972). "The requirement of
§ 2516(1) is simply that the Attorney General 'authorize an application.'
The
method and manner of his authorizing is not prescribed." Id. at 169.
52. United States v. Casale, 341 F. Supp. 374 (M.D. Pa. 1972); United States v.
Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Md. 1972).
53. 341 F. Supp. 374 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
54. Id. at 375; cf. United States v. Whitaker, 343 F. Supp. 358, 360 (E.D. Pa.
1972). The court reasoned that a literal reading could find the Attorney General
only delegated authority but the court concluded this would "elevate semantics above
reality."
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Often the only available evidence, these memoranda are self-serving documents authenticated only by the government's sworn affidavits. Grounds for
questioning their acceptance is found in United States v. Kohne,55 where the
defense attorney produced a memorandum purportedly initialed by Mitchell
and a memorandum from another case, United States v. LaGorga.56 Both
documents were alleged to be signed by Mitchell but had different handwriting. Faced with the discrepancy the government conceded some of the
memoranda from LaGorga were not signed by Mitchell as alleged. As a
result of this admission certain wiretap evidence was ordered suppressed.5 7
Clearly the Department of Justice will continue to side-step the enumerated procedure if they are successful in admitting the wiretap evidence.
This is because of the practical impossibility of personally reviewing all the
applications, and the fact bureaucracy naturally functions by delegation.
Two classes of cases have developed and the results have been remarkably
divergent. Having discovered that one approach leads to certain success and
the other to equally certain failure, conceivably the latter will be avoided.
Nothing prevents the government from claiming in every case that there was
personal authorization by the Attorney General. The few safeguards the
Act had, have been abrogated by the memorandum cases. At present section 2516(1) is merely a costly waste of judicial labor.
In contravention of legislative intent and prevailing judicial construction,
the new proposed Federal Code of Criminal Procedure58 would decentralize,
diversify, and depersonalize the authorization procedure. It retains the existing structure but allows, in addition to the Attorney General and his specially designated Assistant Attorney General, the Deputy Assistant Attorney
General and all United States Attorneys to authorize applications. It fails to
change the game rules; it just increases the players. Under the proposed
code there would no doubt be less litigation but greater divergence from the
intended purposes of the statute.
It is apparent that as a result of the memorandum cases section 2516(1)
has become a nullity because it remains possible to circumvent the requirements of the statute by admitting self-serving memoranda verified only by
affidavit. The actual facts being almost impossible to discover, the most
55. 347 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (W.D.Pa. 1972).
56. 340 F. Supp. 1397 (W.D.Pa. 1972).
57. Id. The United States Attorney on March 31, 1972 filed an affidavit advising the court he had become aware that the memorandum relied on had not been
initialed by the Attorney General as purported.
58. § 3-10C2 provides in part:
(a) Federal.-The Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, any Assistant Attorney General or any United States attorney specially designated by
the Attorney General may authorize an application to a court of competent
jurisdiction for an order authorizing or approving the interception of a private
communication.
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questionable affidavit becomes virtually unchallengeable. The important
consideration is not whether abuse has occurred, but the likelihood that it
could. Important constitutional rights should be better protected.
At present the authorization requirement is unenforceable, but the courts
cannot ignore the clear language of the statute to make it enforceable. If
the fear that engendered passage of section 2516(1) was unfounded, a
stringent procedure is not justified. If justified it is best to rely on more
than the good faith of the restrained. Fault rests with the legislature which
has the power, but not the inclination, to make the authorization procedure
enforceable.
Ronald H. Budman
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